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HALLIBURTON AND THE DOG
THAT DIDN’T BARK
ANN M. LIPTON*
ABSTRACT
In Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., the Supreme Court
held that defendants in a Section 10(b) class action may use the classcertification process to rebut the “fraud on the market” presumption
that their misstatements impacted the price of the relevant security. In so
doing, the Court struggled to explain why the class-certification
process—rather than trial on the merits—was the proper venue for such
disputes, and avoided the most obvious justification, namely, that in the
absence of price impact, plaintiffs would still be able to bring individual
claims. The Court’s unwillingness to hold that plaintiffs may bring
“eyeball” reliance claims even without demonstrating price impact
suggests that the Court has doubts that such claims are viable.
If so, the Court misinterpreted the fraud on the market theory and
the distinction between claims based on individual evaluation of
corporate-specific information and claims based on reliance on the
market price. The Court’s holding could therefore unfairly impact
future claims based on individual reliance. Moreover, the Court’s
willingness to front-load disputes into the class-certification stage—
without offering a clear justification for doing so—demonstrates that
Halliburton was ultimately an exercise in line drawing, representing a
compromise position likely motivated by a desire to protect defendants
from litigation risks.
INTRODUCTION
The fraud on the market doctrine is a legal presumption that
public misrepresentations regarding a security that trades in an “open
1
and developed” market distort the security’s price. Investors who

Copyright © 2015 Ann M. Lipton.
* Associate Professor, Tulane University Law School. Many thanks to Stephen Sachs.
1. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241 (1988).
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purchase the security may then be said to have “relied” on the
misstatement (by paying the manipulated price), allowing them to
satisfy the reliance element of a fraud claim brought under Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and facilitating the
2
aggregation of their claims in a class action. In Halliburton Co. v.
3
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (“Halliburton II”), the Supreme Court
clarified that when plaintiffs seek to certify a class utilizing the fraud
on the market doctrine, defendants may offer rebuttal evidence to
challenge the presumption of price distortion as part of the
certification inquiry. In so doing, the Court struggled to explain why
4
these disputes should be resolved in the context of Rule 23. The
Court’s difficulty with this point suggests it intended something else
entirely: that when defendants make fraudulent representations
concerning a security that trades in an open and developed market,
investors who purchase the security at the market price may only use
the fraud on the market doctrine to satisfy the element of reliance
when bringing a claim under Section 10(b); they may not argue in the
alternative that they personally heard, and actually relied upon, the
misstatement. If this is what the Court meant, it represents a new—
and incorrect—interpretation of the fraud on the market theory,
which could unduly restrict a broad swath of individual actions.
II. THE ROAD SO FAR
Private plaintiffs may use Section 10(b) to bring claims for fraud
in connection with securities transactions. As is the case with most
fraud claims, to prevail, plaintiffs must show that they “relied” upon a
false statement. In one-to-one transactions, such as private sales,
investors receive information supplied directly from the fraudster,
allowing them to identify easily what information they received and
the role it played in their investment decision. But when an investor
purchases a security in an open-market transaction, “reliance” may be
a complicated proposition. Information about publicly traded
securities is usually distributed via press releases, SEC filings,
conference calls with analysts, and so forth. The same or similar
information is often re-publicized multiple times—such as false
earnings reports that appear in different company press releases and
are repeated in successive quarterly reports—before the truth is
2. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (West 2015).
3. 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
4. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (setting forth the standards for class certification).
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revealed and investors suffer losses. Investors may rely directly upon
any of the documents in which the information appears, but they also
make decisions based on information obtained through a variety of
intermediaries—stock
brokers,
analysts,
news
articles,
recommendations by friends or relatives—all of which may, in turn,
incorporate information gleaned from a variety of other sources.
Additionally, investor reliance on these sources of information may
increase demand for a security, causing its price to rise, thus affecting
more investors who purchase at the manipulated price. This entire
ecosystem of investors and information intermediaries constitutes
“the market,” such that a misstatement actually relied upon by a small
segment of the market may ultimately have an impact far beyond its
5
initial audience.
Recognizing these dynamics, courts developed the “fraud on the
market” doctrine for use in Section 10(b) actions, which the Supreme
6
Court endorsed in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. As articulated by the Basic
majority, the doctrine consists of two rebuttable presumptions that
favor Section 10(b) plaintiffs: first, that in an open and developed
market, public, material information about a security will influence its
price, and second, that investors who purchase at the market price are,
in some sense, subjectively “relying” on that price to communicate
7
information about the security’s value. “Material” information,
according to the Basic Court, means information that “would have
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered
8
the total mix of information made available.”
Put together, then, the fraud on the market presumptions allow an
open-market purchaser to establish that he or she “relied,” indirectly,
on a defendant’s fraud, if the purchaser can demonstrate that the
fraudulent information was material. Even if the plaintiff cannot
prove that she personally heard the defendant’s statements or took
them into account when making an investment decision, the plaintiff
may nonetheless establish “indirect” reliance by taking advantage of
the presumptions to show that she purchased the security at a market
price that was distorted by fraud. Defendants are entitled to try to

5. Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion after Halliburton, 90 WASH. U. L.
REV. 895, 901–02 (2013).
6. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
7. See id. at 247.
8. Id. at 231–32.
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rebut these presumptions, but if they fail to do so, the plaintiff will
prevail on the reliance element of her claims.
The fraud on the market doctrine has been employed to establish
9
reliance in lawsuits brought by individual investors, but it has
attracted extensive judicial and scholarly attention because of its role
in facilitating class-action claims. Not only does the doctrine make it
easier for a plaintiff to establish reliance, but it also allows all plaintiffs
who purchase a given security to establish reliance by common
evidence. Courts entertaining Section 10(b) claims need not conduct
individualized inquiries into the types of information upon which
particular investors relied; the fraud on the market doctrine allows
that question to be resolved for all investors in one fell swoop. As a
result, the doctrine removes the main stumbling block to class
certification for Section 10(b) claims concerning publicly traded
securities. Most classes may only be certified if the plaintiffs
demonstrate that questions “common” to the class predominate over
10
questions that raise individualized issues; the fraud on the market
doctrine replaces individualized questions of reliance with a common
question regarding the characteristics of the market in which the
security traded.
However, the fraud on the market doctrine is not without its
difficulties, starting with the slipperiness of the concept of an “open
and well developed” market. The Basic Court never defined the
phrase, and though it is generally understood that such a market
involves a high volume of secondary trading and relative price
11
transparency, that only begs the question of how active, how liquid,
the market must be to justify a presumption that false information has
impacted a security’s price. The essential difficulty is that no market
perfectly absorbs information the moment at which it is disseminated.
Complex information may be difficult for analysts to digest;
information disclosed in an obscure location may not be immediately
noticed. The more high-profile and widely traded a security, the more
likely it is that new information will be rapidly assimilated, but there
are no bright line rules for determining how quickly a particular type
12
of information will impact prices in various types of markets.

9. Black v. Finantra Capital, Inc., 418 F.3d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 2005).
10. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
11. See, e.g., Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1276 n.17 (D.N.J. 1989).
12. Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 151 WIS. L.
REV. 151, 170 (2009); James D. Cox, Understanding Causation in Private Securities Lawsuits:
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Thus, after Basic, courts faced two conundrums: how open and
developed must a market be before the fraud on the market doctrine
is deemed to apply? And if such an open and developed market exists,
how “public” and easily digestible must the information be before it is
presumed to have an impact? These are related questions—the more
developed the market, the more likely it is that obscure information
will influence stock prices—but the fraud on the market doctrine does
not allow courts to (explicitly) adopt a sliding scale based on the
interaction of market characteristics and statement prominence. As a
result, courts answered the questions with, respectively, “very,” and (at
least in some cases) “minimally.”
For the types of markets subject to the fraud on the market
doctrine, courts have adopted a very demanding standard of
13
“efficiency.” Plaintiffs must show the security trades in a market that
14
rapidly and fully adjusts to all public, material information. This is an
extraordinarily high bar that often excludes, for example, stocks of
15
16
smaller companies, newly issued stock, and securities other than
17
common stock.
At the same time, courts often presume that even “fine print” and
generic disclosures influence prices, such as a representation that the
18
company is in compliance with the law. This is a mixed blessing for
plaintiffs: on the one hand, it means that even obscure statements
buried in lengthy SEC filings can form the basis of a fraud claim, but
on the other hand, it allows defendants to argue that whatever false
information they shouted from the rooftops, a tiny, offsetting
disclosure was sufficient to inform the market of the truth, thus
19
negating any price impact caused by the initial false statement.

Building on Amgen, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1719, 1732 (2013).
13. Langevoort, supra note 12, at 173; James D. Cox, Fraud On The Market After Amgen,
9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 13 (2013).
14. In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005).
15. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Proving Markets Inefficient: The Variability of Federal
Court Decisions on Market Efficiency in Cammer v. Bloom and Its Progeny, 10 U. MIAMI BUS.
L. REV. 303, 322 (2002); Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 474–78 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
16. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 260 F.R.D. 81, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
17. Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier Inc., 546 F.3d 196, 210
(2d Cir. 2008); Aranaz v. Catalyst Pharm. Partners Inc., No. 13-CV-23878-UU, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 136684 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2014).
18. Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 745 (9th Cir. 2008).
19. Courts have taken a wide variety of approaches to arguments that truthful information
has mitigated false information. Some require that the offsetting information be “transmitted to
the public with a degree of intensity and credibility sufficient to effectively counterbalance any
misleading impression” left by the original false statement. Nguyen v. Radient Pharm. Corp.,
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“Either the market is efficient or it is not. A plaintiff in the Investors’
situation must take the bitter with the sweet,” as the Eleventh Circuit
20
put it.
This “truth on the market” corollary to the fraud on the market
doctrine grows directly out of Basic. There, the Court explained that
the presumption of price distortion might be effectively rebutted if,
for example, “the ‘market makers’ were privy to the truth . . . and thus
[] the market price would not have been affected by [defendants’]
21
misrepresentations.” In other words, Basic entertained the possibility
that an offsetting “truth” about a defendant’s fraud might be known
only to a segment of the market, but that this knowledge would be
sufficient to maintain prices at their proper, un-manipulated levels,
22
even if some individual traders remained fooled. Other courts, by
allowing even obscure and scattered bits of nominally public
information to defeat the fraud on the market presumption, implicitly
23
seem to agree. Thus, per Basic, plaintiffs are entitled to an initial

No. SA-CV-11-0406-DOC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122533 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2011). Others are
willing to presume that even piecemeal or obscure disclosures offset much more prominent false
statements. See, e.g., Meyer v. Greene, 710 F.3d 1189, 1197 (11th Cir. 2013); Asher v. Baxter
Int’l Inc., 377 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 2004).
20. Meyer, 710 F.3d at 1199.
21. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 (1988).
22. The traditional view in finance has been that “noise” traders—uninformed investors,
those most likely to be fooled by corporate misstatements—contribute little to a stock’s price,
and that most pricing is due to the trades of sophisticated investors who are harder to mislead.
See John M. Newman, Jr. et al., Basic Truths: The Implications of the Fraud-on-the-Market
Theory for Evaluating the “Misleading” and “Materiality” Elements of Securities Fraud Claims,
20 IOWA J. CORP. L. 571, 574 (1995). This traditional view, however, has been challenged by
other studies that demonstrate the influence of “noise” traders. See, e.g., Claire Hill, Why
Financial Appearances Might Matter: An Explanation for “Dirty Pooling” and Some Other
Types of Financial Cosmetics, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 141 (1997).
23. Meyer, 710 F.3d at 1197; In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2005). To
be sure, the line between the materiality concept as a general category, and the truth on the
market concept as subset of that category, is a fuzzy one. Materiality is gauged in light of the
“total mix of information made available.” Basic, 485 U.S. at 232. Truth on the market is also a
claim that the total mix of information prevented the false information from having an impact
on price. Thus, on first blush, the two may appear to be coextensive. Nonetheless, at least in
theory, truth on the market remains a distinct subset of the materiality analysis, because it
depends on the aggregated trading behavior of the market as a whole, rather than the effect of
the misrepresentation on a hypothetical investor. The difference becomes plain when one
considers that materiality is gauged from the point of view of the “reasonable investor,” who
typically is interpreted to mean a typical retail investor. Stefan J. Padfield, Immaterial Lies:
Condoning Deceit in the Name of Securities Regulation, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 143, 155
(2010). Retail investors are not necessarily charged with understanding, or even being aware of,
all information made public; an offsetting “truth” might be “available” in nominally public
fashion to sophisticated investors without being available to, or comprehensible by, retail
investors. Markets may even theoretically incorporate privately held “truths,” as Basic seems to
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presumption that public, material false information distorts stock
prices but—also per Basic—defendants are entitled to rebut that
presumption by, among other things, demonstrating that the truth was
“known” to some, though not necessarily all, persons.
Plaintiffs and defendants invariably lock horns over the types of
statements, and markets, that justify the presumption of price impact,
but they also dispute when courts should make determinations about
these issues. In general, they agree that plaintiffs should have the
burden of establishing that a market is open and developed at the
class-certification stage (though disputes continue over the definition
of “open and developed” and what evidence is required to establish
its presence). But here the agreement ends: plaintiffs and defendants
have continually relitigated the extent to which the specific issue of
price distortion—whether it occurred at all and at what point the
price was restored to its “correct” level—may be decided at the classcertification stage. Defendants have generally argued that, as with
market efficiency, absent price impact there can be no class-wide
determination of reliance; therefore, the question is ripe for resolution
as part of the class-certification process. Plaintiffs, by contrast, insist
that once market efficiency is established, any remaining questions
should be decided by the factfinder at summary judgment or trial.
III. THIRD TIME’S THE CHARM?
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to decide the proper
scope of the fraud on the market class-certification inquiry on three
24
separate occasions, the latter two of which are relevant here. In
25
Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, the Court considered
contemplate. Thus, when courts entertain securities claims that are not predicated on fraud on
the market, plaintiffs may satisfy the element of “materiality” even when offsetting information
was generally available, because, depending on the context, courts may refuse to charge
plaintiffs with knowledge of extraneous source material. See, e.g., N.J. Carpenters Health Fund
v. Royal Bank of Scot. Group, PLC, 709 F.3d 109, 127 (2d Cir. 2013); United Paperworkers Int’l
Union v. Int’l Paper Co., 985 F.2d 1190, 1199 (2d Cir. 1993); Kapps v. Torch Offshore, Inc., 379
F.3d 207, 214–15 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Va. Bankshares v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097
(1991) (holding, outside the fraud on the market context, that “not every mixture with the true
will neutralize the deceptive. If it would take a financial analyst to spot the tension between the
one and the other, whatever is misleading will remain materially so”).
24. The first time, in Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011)
(“Halliburton I”), the Court ended up avoiding the most significant disputes. See id. at 2187 n.*
(“According to Halliburton, a plaintiff must prove price impact only after Basic’s presumption
has been successfully rebutted by the defendant. We express no views on the merits of such a
framework.”) (citation omitted).
25. 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013).
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whether materiality is appropriate for resolution at the classcertification stage. Materiality plays a dual role in Section 10(b)
litigation: it is a required element of the plaintiff’s claim, and it is also
a precondition for the presumption of price impact to apply. The
Amgen defendants contended that because the presumption of price
impact necessarily rests on the materiality of the alleged false
statements, there could be no such presumption—and thus no
commonality on the element of reliance—absent materiality. They
therefore argued that plaintiffs should be required to prove
materiality or, at the very least, defendants should be granted the
26
opportunity to rebut materiality, as part of the Rule 23 inquiry.
The Court rejected the argument, reasoning that because
materiality is a required element of any Section 10(b) claim, its lack
would not create individualized issues. Absent materiality, there may
be no price impact, but there is also no claim; the case will stand or
fall for all plaintiffs, equally. Thus, materiality is not an element that
distinguishes claims that can be resolved on a class-wide basis from
claims that cannot, and it is therefore inappropriate for determination
27
at the class-certification stage.
In Halliburton II, the Supreme Court again took up the issue of
fraud on the market and class certification. This time, the defendants
were more direct in their challenge. They sought to have the Court
overturn Basic v. Levinson entirely, in part on the ground that
markets are too erratic to justify presuming that any particular
28
statement affects securities prices. But, similar to the Amgen
defendants, they argued in the alternative that, because the Basic
presumption of price impact is rebuttable, defendants should be
permitted to offer their rebuttal evidence at the class-certification
29
stage.
The Court rejected the defendants’ frontal assault on Basic.
30
Echoing a point made by a number of scholars, the Court held that
markets need not be perfectly efficient to justify a presumption that

26. See id. at 1191.
27. See id.
28. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2409–10.
29. See id. at 2413.
30. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 12, at 171–72; Bradford Cornell & James C. Rutten,
Market Efficiency, Crashes, and Securities Litigation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 443, 456 (2006); Cox,
supra note 12, at 1732.
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31

false information generally affects prices. Instead, it described the
Basic presumption of price impact as “modest,” resting only on the
premise that “market professionals generally consider most publicly
32
announced material statements about companies.” The Court’s
holding on this point has led Donald Langevoort to speculate that
going forward, courts may loosen their overly strict definitions of
33
market efficiency.
After affirming Basic’s continued vitality, the Court accepted
defendants’ fallback position that they should be permitted to rebut
the presumption of price impact as a part of their challenge to class
certification. In doing so, the Court had to distinguish Amgen and
explain why rebuttal evidence concerning price impact was
appropriate while rebuttal evidence concerning materiality was not.
Happily, there is a natural explanation that flows from Amgen’s
logic: Price impact, unlike materiality, is not a necessary element of a
Section 10(b) claim. Price impact is simply one mechanism for
proving the element of reliance. If defendants establish there has been
no price impact, they have made it impossible for plaintiffs to
establish reliance on a common basis, but there remains the possibility
that some investors may have personally heard the false statements,
and can establish reliance in the traditional manner. Thus, a lack of
price impact creates individualized issues. This is different from
materiality because a lack of materiality destroys all plaintiffs’ claims
across the board.
That is what one would have expected the Court to hold. But at
this point, Halliburton II took a surprising turn. Because even though
the above explanation is simple, readily available, and congruent with
Amgen, it is not the explanation that the Court offered. Instead, the
Court wrote:
The fact that a misrepresentation was reflected in the market price
at the time of the transaction . . . is Basic’s fundamental premise. . . .
That is why, if reliance is to be shown through the Basic
presumption, the publicity and market efficiency prerequisites
must be proved before class certification. Without proof of those

31. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2410.
32. Id. (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 n. 24).
33. Donald C. Langevoort, Judgment Day for Fraud-on-the-Market: Reflections on Amgen
and the Second Coming of Halliburton, 57 ARIZ. L., REV. 37, 53 (2015) (expressing hope that
“Halliburton II will take the steam out of” efforts by defendants to convince courts that markets
must be “hyper” efficient to justify application of the doctrine).
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prerequisites, the fraud-on-the-market theory underlying the
presumption completely collapses, rendering class certification
inappropriate.
But as explained, publicity and market efficiency are nothing more
than prerequisites for an indirect showing of price impact. There is
no dispute that at least such indirect proof of price impact is
needed to ensure that the questions of law or fact common to the
class will predominate. . . .
Our choice in this case, then, is not between allowing price impact
evidence at the class certification stage or relegating it to the
merits. Evidence of price impact will be before the court at the
certification stage in any event. The choice, rather, is between
limiting the price impact inquiry before class certification to
indirect evidence, or allowing consideration of direct evidence as
well. As explained, we see no reason to artificially limit the inquiry
34
at the certification stage to indirect evidence of price impact.

In this passage, the Court avoided the easiest argument, i.e., that
the absence of price impact, unlike the absence of materiality, creates
individualized issues. Instead, the Court made a procedural argument:
because a trial court must, one way or another, consider evidence of
price impact at class certification (by examining market efficiency and
the publicity of the challenged statements), it should consider all the
evidence available (except, apparently, evidence of materiality). The
35
dog, one might say, did not bark.
Which leads to the question: why?
The natural conclusion is that the Court doubts individual
plaintiffs can bring actual reliance claims—”eyeball” reliance, as
practitioners call it—based on false statements made in an open and
developed market, at least not without also demonstrating price
impact. That, in fact, is exactly what was argued by the Halliburton II
36
plaintiff and the United States as amicus, a point which the Court
obliquely appeared to accept:
[W]e held [in Amgen] that [materiality] should be left to the merits
stage, because it does not bear on the predominance requirement

34. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2416–17 (quotations, citations, and alterations omitted).
35. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 406 (1991) (citing A. Doyle, Silver Blaze, in THE
COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 335 (1927)).
36. See Brief for Respondent at 50, Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-317)
[hereinafter Brief for Respondent]; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 30, Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-317) [hereinafter Brief for the
United States].
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of Rule 23(b)(3). . . . We [] noted that a failure to prove materiality
would necessarily defeat every plaintiff’s claim on the merits; . . . In
this latter respect, we explained, materiality differs from the
publicity and market efficiency prerequisites, neither of which is
necessary to prove a Rule 10b-5 claim on the merits.
[The plaintiff] argues that much of the foregoing could be said of
37
price impact as well. Fair enough.

Indeed, the seeds of such a conclusion were sown in Amgen itself,
because in Amgen, the defendants offered what was essentially a truth
38
on the market defense to the plaintiffs’ allegations of materiality. A
truth on the market defense allows for the possibility that some
investors were fooled by the false statement, even though the false
statement did not impact the security’s price. Yet the Amgen Court
still held that all of the plaintiffs’ claims would fail if the defendants
prevailed in their argument that “the market”—meaning the market
39
price—reflected the truth.
If this is the correct interpretation of Halliburton II, it means
fraud on the market is more than just an alternative mechanism for
establishing reliance. It means fraud on the market is the only
mechanism for establishing reliance, at least for securities that trade
“efficiently.”
IV. BACK TO BASICS
If the Halliburton II Court intended to imply that individual
claims for reliance are not viable in the context of open-market
frauds, it would be an intriguing throwback to the origins of the fraud

37. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2416 (emphasis added).
38. For example, they claimed that analysts who “scrutinized Amgen’s business” had not
been fooled, see Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 8, Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds v.
Amgen Inc., 660 F.3d 1170 (No. 09.56965), (9th Cir. 2011), and pointed out that the truth could
have been inferred by a diligent perusal of a particular announcement that the FDA had placed
in the Federal Register, Brief for Petitioners at 50, Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust
Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013) (No. 11-1085). They did not, however, contend either that their
misstatements were per se immaterial, or that countervailing information was widely available
to investors generally.
39. Significantly, a similar idea is built into the securities laws themselves. Section 18 of the
Securities Exchange Act provides a private right of action based on false statements in SEC
filings, but requires plaintiffs to demonstrate both actual reliance, and that the false statement
impacted the market price, before they can bring a claim. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78r (West 2015).
Individual reliance, absent price impact, is not enough. This was, in fact, one of the arguments
advanced by the defendants in Halliburton II, and Basic before that: to allow plaintiffs to allege
reliance via fraud on the market would undermine the more restrictive requirements of Section
18. See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2409.
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40

on the market doctrine. In a 1982 article, Professor Daniel Fischel
advocated replacing the traditional reliance inquiry with fraud on the
market, and in his formulation—if the “market” itself was not
“fooled”—no investor would have a claim, even if he or she actually
relied on the false statement. As he put it,
Suppose that an investor, after reading a false statement, believes
that a particular investment offers a superior rate of return and
invests accordingly. The market, however, ignores the false
statement so that it has no effect on the market price. . . . If there
has been no fraud on the market . . . investors have not been
induced to invest by any fraudulent conduct of the defendant. The
law has never compensated for injury where the so-called
reasonable man—in this case the market—has not been misled.
Such investors earned the market rate of return and are entitled to
41
no more.

Thus, in Fischel’s view, an investor who purchased at an
undistorted price could not have experienced any injury, because she
would have received fair value for her investment. The market’s
accurate valuation of the security would break any chain of causation
between the original misstatement and the injury suffered by the
42
investor.
Both the Halliburton II plaintiff, and the United States as amicus,
advanced a similar argument. Each contended that in the absence of
price impact, there could be no individual claims because no investor
43
would be able to prove “loss causation.” Loss causation, an
independent element of Section 10(b), requires the investor to show
that the fraud caused her injuries. In open market frauds, this
generally occurs when the truth is disclosed and the market adjusts to
the new information by “correcting” the price of the stock. If the
market is never misled, any subsequent drops in stock price cannot be
attributed to corrections of the original false information, and
investors cannot incur compensable losses. Or more simply, if the
market price was undistorted, the investor by definition got what she
paid for.

40. Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving
Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. LAW. 1 (1982).
41. See id. at 14–15.
42. See id. at 15 (arguing that there can be no causal connection between the harm and the
false statement “by definition” where “the market price was not affected”).
43. Brief for Respondent, supra note 36, at 50; Brief for United States, supra note 36, at
30.
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Yet this narrow view of compensable losses overlooks the fact that
the “market” price reflects the different judgments and expectations
of heterogeneous investors regarding the relative weight to put on
44
different types of information, and a multiplicity of judgments on
this point may still be rational. To borrow Fischel’s terminology, the
“market” is not a single reasonable man, but thousands of them.
Investors who do not rely on any information at all—index investors,
for example—may be said to have accepted the market’s judgment of
value and, in the absence of price distortion, to have gotten precisely
45
what they paid for. But investors who evaluate stock information
individually form their own assessments of the value of publicly
available information. Among other things, they may reach varying,
but still rational, conclusions as to the likelihood of different
outcomes, and they may weight information differently based on their
own personal risk tolerances. Some may be willing to tolerate a highrisk investment with a high potential payoff; others may prefer a lowrisk investment with a low potential payoff. The two investments
might have identical expected values (and thus identical stock prices),
but investors with lower risk tolerances suffer a real harm when a
stock turns out to be riskier than they expected, and prices drop as a
result.
Imagine, for example, a company has a new drug application
pending before the FDA. If the drug is approved, the stock price will
soar; if the drug is rejected, the company will be worthless. The
“market” will value the stock at some formula representing the
expected value of the future sales balanced against the risk of nonapproval. But this price masks a variety of risk tolerances. Some
investors may only invest if they believe that approval is all but
certain; others may be diversified and thus indifferent to risk; still
others may be risk-seeking. If the company fraudulently inflates its
chances of approval, then even if the market as a whole is not fooled,
investors who directly relied on the misstatements may have been
fraudulently induced to assume a risk they did not intend to assume,
and should be entitled to recover if they suffer damages when the risk
46
materializes.

44. Cox, supra note 13, at 15.
45. Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 811 (2009).
46. See id. at 854. Individuals who allege that their broker violated their duties by
recommending “unsuitable” securities have a similar argument: The securities may have been
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This issue has repeatedly arisen in the context of claims brought
47
under Section 11 of the Securities Act
for fraudulent
misrepresentations in connection with mutual funds. Open-ended
mutual fund shares are priced based on the market value of the
securities they hold; thus, so long as their holdings are accurately
valued, the shares are priced correctly. Nonetheless, in many cases,
plaintiffs have alleged that funds fraudulently misrepresented their
investment strategy, choosing high-risk investments over low-risk
ones. In these cases, investors incurred losses when the strategies
failed to pay off. Though the shares were priced “correctly” in the
sense that risk and reward were properly balanced, investors
nonetheless claimed they had been injured because they had been
fraudulently induced to assume a greater degree of risk than they
intended. Currently, courts disagree as to whether damages are
48
recoverable under such circumstances.
Just prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Halliburton II, the
49
district court in In re BP p.l.c. Securities Litigation had occasion to
recognize this distinction between eyeball reliance and fraud on the
market reliance. In that case, the plaintiffs claimed BP inflated its
stock price by misrepresenting its safety protocols. Eventually, BP’s
statements were proved to be false (and investors were harmed) when
the Deepwater Horizon exploded, sending the company’s stock price
plummeting. But the market’s reaction to the explosion—i.e.,
disclosure of the inadequacy of BP’s safety precautions—was far
more extreme than it would have been had BP told the truth before
the explosion. In other words, the price reaction to the explosion
included both the market’s revised assessment of the value of BP’s
safety protocols, and the market’s assessment of harm to the company
50
as a result of the explosion. Had the truth been disclosed before the
explosion, there would have likely been a stock price drop, but it
would have been far less dramatic than it was when 62,000 barrels of

properly priced based on risk versus reward, but they were not appropriate for an investor with
the plaintiff’s specific risk tolerances. Norman S. Poser, Liability of Broker-Dealers for
Unsuitable Recommendations to Institutional Investors, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1493.
47. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77k (West 2015).
48. Compare In re Charles Schwab Corp. Securities Litig., 257 F.R.D. 534 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
with In re State Street Bank and Trust Co. Fixed Inc. Funds Inv. Litig., 774 F. Supp. 2d 584
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
49. 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69900 (S.D. Tex. May 20, 2014), aff’d Ludlow v. BP, P.L.C.,
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 15938 (5th Cir. Tex. Sept. 8, 2015).
50. Fisch, supra note 45, at 849.
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oil were gushing into the ocean every day for months on end. The
difference, essentially, was between an ex ante warning of increased
risk of an explosion—more likely, but not certain to occur—and the
ex post materialization of that risk.
The question before the court in BP was, which damages were
recoverable by the plaintiffs? Could the plaintiffs recover damages
associated both with the fraudulently described safety measures and
their consequence (the explosion)? Or were plaintiffs limited to
damages associated solely with the misrepresentations concerning
51
safety?
52
In the district court’s view—later affirmed by the Fifth Circuit —
plaintiffs proceeding under a fraud on the market theory were
entitled only to damages equal to the amount by which the stock was
inflated before the explosion. But plaintiffs who had made their own
risk assessments by directly relying on BP’s misstatements were
entitled to recover for the “consequential” damages of the explosion,
because these investors had been fooled into assuming a risk they had
53
sought to avoid.
The court’s analysis in this regard was unique. First, the court
implicitly offered a rationale for allowing investors to recover
damages even when a lie did not impact prices, namely, that investors
are entitled to set their own risk tolerances, and these judgments are
worthy of the securities laws’ respect. Second, and perhaps more
strikingly, the court explicitly held that damages in a Section 10(b)
action should vary depending on the plaintiffs’ theory of reliance.
In fact, the proper measure of damages in a Section 10(b) fraud on
the market case is very uncertain because most Section 10(b) cases
settle or are dismissed before definitive court determinations are
made. When the issue arises, courts typically recite that the proper
54
measure of damages is the price paid relative to the value received, a
formulation that would seem to exclude damages for the portion of a
stock price drop solely attributable to the ex post materialization of a
concealed risk. But plaintiffs typically argue that the value of the
security should be measured after the risks materialize and the full
truth is revealed to investors, and courts have at least allowed for the

51.
52.
53.
54.

BP, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *82–84.
Ludlow v. BP, P.L.C., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 15938 (5th Cir. Tex. Sept. 8, 2015).
See id. at *87–88.
Rosado v. China N. E. Petrol. Holdings, Ltd., 692 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2012).
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possibility that damages for risk materialization may be appropriate.
Several circuits have permitted the element of loss causation to be
56
satisfied through risk materialization as well, which suggests that
damages may follow. Thus, although there is extensive academic
commentary on the subject of the proper measure of fraud on the
57
58
market damages, there is little definitive caselaw.
From some policy perspectives, the distinction drawn by the BP
court was sound. Markets only become efficient through active
trading, i.e., the trades of investors who examine publicly available
information and make individual investment decisions. “Passive”
investors, those who rely solely on indices or other broad trading
strategies, do not trade based on new information and thus contribute
nothing to market efficiency—they free-ride on the efforts of traders
who analyze firm-specific information. “Active” investors may
therefore have the strongest claim to recover damages caused by
59
fraud, as many commenters have argued.
But in BP, the court did more than simply announce that damages
would be measured differently for active and passive investors.
Instead, it denied class certification on the ground that distinguishing
between the two groups for damages purposes would cause
60
individualized issues to predominate over common ones. And even
assuming all investors were passive, the court held that plaintiffs had
the burden of coming forward with a mechanism for segmenting the
damages caused solely by the misstatements (the only damages to
which the class would be entitled) from the consequential damages of
the explosion, if only to demonstrate that such calculations would not

55. Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 688 F.3d 713, 728 n.27 (11th Cir. 2012); see
also Ludlow, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 15938, at *36.
56. See, e.g., Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2005).
57. Frederick C. Dunbar & Arun Sen, Counterfactual Keys to Causation and Damages in
Shareholder Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 199; Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan, Using
Finance Theory to Measure Damages in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 UCLA L. REV. 883
(1990); Bradford Cornell & James C. Rutten, Collateral Damage and Securities Litigation, 2009
UTAH L. REV. 717.
58. The problem is made more difficult by the likelihood that the concealment of a fraud
allows it to worsen and increases the likelihood of larger damages. For example, had BP
admitted the flaws in its safety protocols, either the market—or regulators—would likely have
forced the company to fix them before the incident occurred.
59. See Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation,
2009 WIS. L. REV. 333, 348; A. C. Pritchard, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. ScientificAtlanta: The Political Economy of Securities Class Action Reform, 2007-08 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
217, 237–38.
60. See BP, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69900, at *88–90.
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61

require individualized inquiries. Because the plaintiffs could not
62
satisfy this burden, the class was not certified. In other words, the
court used the distinction between “actual” reliance damages and
fraud on the market damages as a backdoor mechanism for shifting
the burden of establishing price impact onto the plaintiffs at class
certification.
But it is not clear that BP is consistent with Halliburton II. If
Halliburton II eliminates eyeball reliance as a basis for a claim, then
there can be no distinction between eyeball reliance and fraud on the
market reliance in terms of damages calculations, and the existence—
or not—of eyeball reliance cannot defeat class certification. But this
puts us back where we started: if individualized reliance does not
create a viable basis for a claim in the open market context, why is
price impact appropriate for determination at class certification? And
if the answer is simply administrative convenience—the expert
analysis will be before the court anyway—then perhaps BP was
correct to demand a damages methodology, because that, too, is
closely related to the price impact dispute that the Supreme Court has
now authorized for resolution as part of the Rule 23 inquiry.
V. HALLIBURTON II’S IMPLICATIONS
The above analysis may seem like an angels-on-pinheads debate.
Most investors employ fraud on the market theories when pursuing
claims for open-market frauds. Cases are likely few and far between
where the market remains unmoved by a fraud, and yet an investor—
one with sufficient resources to file a lawsuit—is able to demonstrate
63
actual reliance. So if there are not likely to be many situations in
which an investor has a viable claim in the absence of price impact,
what difference does all of this make?

61. The court believed this result was mandated by Comcast Corporation v. Behrend, 133
S. Ct. 1426 (2013), which overturned a lower courts’ certification order on the ground that
plaintiffs had failed to establish that there existed a common methodology for determining
damages across all class members. Most courts, however, have held that, Comcast
notwithstanding, failure to establish a common damages methodology, standing alone, should
not defeat class certification. See, e.g., Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 801–02 (7th
Cir. 2013); Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp., 778 F.3d 401, 408 (2d Cir. 2015).
62. See BP, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69900, at *90.
63. As described above, see supra note 59, more recent studies suggest that sophisticated
players cannot consistently correct the pricing mistakes of novices. Moreover, investors with the
resources and losses to make an individual lawsuit worthwhile are likely to be institutions or
wealthy individuals with access to expert market analysis.
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Most obviously, it may make a difference in “opt out” litigation.
Though investors rarely file open-market Section 10(b) claims on
their own, there is an increasing tendency for institutional investors to
opt out of fraud on the market class actions and seek individual
64
recoveries. These investors continue to press fraud on the market
theories of reliance, but they may additionally allege “actual” reliance.
And now that In re BP p.l.c. Securities Litigation has held that
“actual” reliance claims are more valuable than fraud on the market
claims, investors have very strong additional incentives both to optout of fraud on the market class actions, and to allege actual reliance.
Yet if Halliburton II prohibits eyeball reliance allegations, investors
may be stymied in this attempt.
But to the extent Halliburton II does imply that eyeball reliance
claims may not be pursued in efficient markets, its greatest impact is
likely to be felt in the gap between fact and evidence. There may be
few cases where in fact investors actually relied on false statements
that had no price impact, but investors may often find it easier to
prove actual reliance over price impact.
For example, as described above, courts have been willing to
assume that in markets designated as “efficient,” even very obscure
and piecemeal bits of information offset the impact of much more
65
prominent misstatements. If courts use artificial rules of thumb to
“find” the existence of an offset, investors may prefer to simply allege
actual reliance. This is particularly so given Halliburton II’s apparent
relaxation of the definition of market efficiency, allowing a greater
variety of markets to be included in the category. But if Halliburton II
is taken to mean that actual reliance claims are not viable, even
investors who are capable of demonstrating actual reliance may be
66
left without any remedy at all.

64. Joshua H. Vinik, Why institutional investors are opting out of class-action litigation,
PENSIONS & INVEST. (July 25, 2009), available at http://www.pionline.com/article/20110725/
PRINT/307259985/why-institutional-investors-are-opting-out-of-class-action-litigation.
65. See text accompanying notes 22–24.
66. State law may potentially provide more expansive remedies than those that might be
available under Section 10(b). However, assuming state law would yield a different result (states
often look to federal law to define common law fraud claims, see, e.g., King Cnty. v. IKB
Deutsche Industriebank AG, 708 F. Supp. 2d 334, 338 n. 25 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)), even investors
who claim actual reliance may want to coordinate their lawsuits with any pending federal class
actions to save on discovery costs. If they do so, under the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78bb (West 2015), they will be forbidden from advancing state law
claims. Indeed, even investors who do not wish to coordinate with a federal class action may find
it impossible to advance state law claims so long as a federal class action is pending. See
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Similar mischief may result from the price impact inquiry
mandated by Halliburton II at class certification. Theoretically, there
are only three reasons why a public false statement would not
influence a security’s price: First, the statement was immaterial in and
of itself (which courts are not permitted to consider), second, the
market already knew the truth (which again, per Amgen Inc. v. Conn.
67
Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, courts may not consider), or third, the
market was simply not that efficient in the first place (an issue that, by
hypothesis, has already been resolved in plaintiffs’ favor by the time
the price impact inquiry arises). Thus, the available tools for
examining price impact at the class-certification stage are sharply, and
68
artificially, circumscribed.
The Supreme Court (and, in 1982, Fischel) seized upon “event
studies”—a type of statistical analysis that is used to identify
abnormal stock price movements—as a mechanism for identifying
69
price impact. But, as multiple scholars have elsewhere explored,
event studies are quite limited, and are frequently misunderstood,
70
even by courts that employ them. For example, if the defendant
conceals bad news rather than inventing fictional good news, the
market will assume its existing valuation is correct, and there will be
no price movement for the event study to detect. If multiple pieces of
news are released simultaneously, event studies cannot shed light on
which exerted a pull on the stock’s price because they lack the
71
capacity to distinguish multiple causes occurring simultaneously. So

Benjamin P. Edwards, Disaggregated Classes, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 305 (2015).
67. See Aranaz v. Catalyst Pharm. Partners Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136684 (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 29, 2014).
68. Moreover, as the Supreme Court recognized in Halliburton I, the existence of a price
drop when the truth is revealed cannot be reliably used to determine whether there was price
impact at the time of the initial misstatement. See Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011); see
also Donald C. Langevoort, Compared to What? Econometric Evidence and the Counterfactual
Difficulty, 35 J. CORP. L. 183 (2009).
69. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble With Price Distortion After Halliburton, 90 WASH.
U. L. REV. 895, 919–20 (2013); Alon Brav & J.B. Heaton, Event Studies in Securities Litigation:
Low Power, Confounding Effects, and Bias (Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. 2015).
70. Fisch, supra note 69, at 919–20.
71. Recent research suggests that some companies intentionally release negative news in a
manner designed to mask stock price effects. See, e.g., Ed DeHaan et al., Market (In)Attention
and the Strategic Scheduling and Timing of Earnings Announcements, (Social Science Electronic
Publishing, Inc. 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2545966;
At least some of this behavior is apparently designed to thwart shareholder litigation. See
Michael Furchtgott & Frank Partnoy, Disclosure Strategies and Shareholder Litigation Risk. ,
(Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2585267.
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a qualitative assessment of market reaction (in addition to event
studies’ “quantitative” assessment) is often a critical component of
the price impact inquiry, and yet this is precisely what courts are
forbidden to examine at class certification. As a result, the
72
opportunity for error and confusion is vast, which may create further
scenarios in which individual investors believe their only hope for
73
recovery is an “actual” reliance claim.
Finally, it is worth noting that although Fischel equated reliance
with price impact, he also believed price impact would replace the
materiality inquiry entirely. In his view, information that impacts stock
price is material by definition; once price impact has been detected,
any inquiry into materiality is at an end. Yet the judiciary has been
unwilling to relinquish control over materiality determinations, and in
Basic v. Levinson, the Supreme Court adopted a test for materiality
74
that makes no reference to price impact at all. As a result, courts

72. Such confusion was recently demonstrated by the district court in Halliburton itself.
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Halliburton II, the plaintiffs renewed their class
certification motion before the district court. They alleged that certain false statements were
repeated from July 1999 through mid-2001, and that the truth was gradually revealed in a series
of corrective disclosures from June 2001 through December 2001. The district court accepted
the argument that if the corrective disclosures did not cause a detectable price drop, that itself
was evidence that the original false statements had not caused any inflation. Erica P. John
Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97464, *31 (N.D. Tex. July 25, 2015). Even
accepting this debatable premise, however, the district court was unable to find a way to apply
it. The court held that out of the several disclosures alleged, only the final one, issued on
December 7, 2001, caused Halliburton’s stock price to fall, and issued an order purporting to
“grant[] in part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, only with respect to the alleged
corrective disclosure of December 7, 2001.” Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97464, *96 (N.D. Tex. July 25, 2015). This, of course, is meaningless; the
plaintiffs had sought certification of a class of persons who had purchased Halliburton stock
between July 1999 and December 2001, and the court’s order shed no light on whether this
motion was granted or denied, or even whether the false statements issued from July 1999
through mid-2001 were deemed to have impacted Halliburton’s price in a situation where some
disclosures caused a price drop, and others did not. In other words, having wandered down the
garden path of corrective disclosures as evidence of price impact, the court appears to have
forgotten the reason for its journey.
73. If a court determines that a defendant has “disproved” price impact at class
certification, an investor advancing an individual claim would presumably not be bound by that
determination, and could continue to press for a fraud on the market presumption of reliance
outside the class-action context. However, as a practical matter, individual investors may believe
that a court, having made a determination of no price impact at class certification, will be
reluctant to disturb that finding in an individual proceeding. This, in fact, is exactly what
occurred in In re Moody’s Corp. Secs. Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122449, at *27 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 22, 2013).
74. The Basic test for materiality looks to whether the information “would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total mix of information
made available.” Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988).
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today frequently base materiality determinations solely on their own
intuitions as to what a reasonable investor would—or should—
75
consider when making an investment decision. In some cases, courts
have actively rejected evidence of price impact in favor of their own
76
materiality determinations. This approach to materiality is
inconsistent with a requirement that reliance be equated with price
impact. Either the market is the final arbiter of what an investor
values, or it is not; otherwise, investors are caught in a “heads I win,
tails you lose” trap, where price impact may be ignored or required
precisely as needed to reject a claim.
VI. WHITHER CLASS CERTIFICATION
Ultimately, Halliburton II was an exercise in baby-splitting. The
Court based its decision not on the existence (or lack thereof) of
individualized issues, but on its dissatisfaction, procedurally, with
conducting only half an inquiry into price impact at the classcertification stage. The Court reasoned that as long as “indirect”
measures of price impact (efficiency and publicity) were to be
considered at class certification, it was only fair to consider certain
“direct” measures as well.
But the better question might be, why even consider the indirect
measures? The efficiency inquiry will be revisited by a jury on the
77
merits, and if the evidence is sufficiently clear one way or the other,
the matter can be resolved via summary judgment. In other words, the
question of market efficiency is itself common to the class. So why is

75. David A. Hoffman, The “Duty” to Be a Rational Shareholder, 90 MINN. L. REV. 537
(2006).
76. For example, in Greenhouse v. MCG Capital Corp., 392 F.3d 650 (4th Cir. 2004), the
defendant company’s stock price dropped upon disclosure that its CEO had never graduated
college. The Fourth Circuit nonetheless held that the information was not material in light of his
other accomplishments. See id. at 658. Similarly, in In re Merck & Co. Securities Litigation, 432
F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2005), the Third Circuit held that a company’s accounting methodology was
not material, because the company’s stock price did not react when the method was first
disclosed in the footnotes to the corporate financial statements. See id. at 269. In so doing, the
court ignored the fact that the stock price plummeted when the methodology was more
accessibly publicized in a Wall Street Journal article a few months later. See id. at 265. Most
recently, in Police Ret. Sys. v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 759 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2014), the Ninth
Circuit held that courts should decide whether statements are immaterial “puffery”—incapable
of being relied upon by rational investors—without considering whether such statements did, in
fact, impact stock prices. See id. at 1060. In other words, the court implicitly concluded that
statements may be deemed immaterial as a matter of law even in the face of evidence that a
significant segment of the market actually relied upon them.
77. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 n.6 (2011).
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efficiency appropriate for consideration at class certification in the
first place?
This problem is actually a specific instance of a broader
theoretical uncertainty in class-action procedure. Class certification is
appropriate when the questions raised are “capable of classwide
78
resolution,” but whether a question is capable of class-wide
resolution depends on the level of generality at which the question is
79
posed. The initial question of which questions must be considered is
not one that can be answered by resort to abstractions, but only via a
functional analysis of Rule 23’s commonality and predominance
inquiries.
The most basic justification for the commonality/predominance
aspects of Rule 23 is that courts must protect plaintiffs by ensuring
that they are not bound by a judgment in a proceeding where their
80
interests were not represented. If class members differ from each
other, they may benefit from different (or conflicting) forms of relief,
or factual determinations adverse to the named plaintiffs may not
fairly apply to the class as a whole. In the Section 10(b) context, for
example, courts might fear that if the class is improperly certified and
a jury later determines the market was not efficient, the class may lose
on the merits, which will then be res judicata even against absent class
81
members who may have had viable “eyeball reliance” claims.
78. Id. at 2551.
79. Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 97, 131–32 (2009). The case of Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467 (2d Cir. 2010), is instructive.
There, the plaintiffs sought class certification on their claims that the City of New York had
violated their constitutional rights and engaged in malicious prosecution and false imprisonment
by arresting them under a statute that had been declared unconstitutional years earlier. The
City argued that individualized determinations would be required regarding the circumstances
of each arrest; the Second Circuit rejected that argument, on the ground that merely the
question whether the circumstances of each arrest was relevant was itself a question common to
the class. See id. at 485–86.
80. See, e.g., Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997); Gen. Tel. Co. of the
Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160–61 (1982). Because Rule 23 is generally viewed as a
mechanism for protecting absent class members from binding adverse determinations, courts
frequently note that there is a certain fox-guarding-henhouse quality to allowing defendants to
challenge certification. See, e.g., Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers’ Local 130, 657
F.2d 890, 895 (7th Cir. 1981); Coffin v. Bowater Inc., 229 F.R.D. 397, 408 n.13 (D. Me. 2005).
81. Another justification is to protect courts from being forced to undertake a variety of
unwieldy, individualized determinations as a result of an insufficiently cohesive class. But
market efficiency, or its lack, does not create this kind of risk. If there is a danger that a lack of
market efficiency will cause the action to devolve into individualized inquiries, that danger
persists even after a judge makes a preliminary efficiency determination, precisely because the
jury may revisit the question. And because all other aspects of the Section 10(b) action—
materiality, falsity, scienter, and the like—are common across class members, there is little risk

LIPTON 11.6.15 FINAL READ VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

HALLIBURTON AND THE DOG THAT DIDN’T BARK

11/23/2015 2:57 PM

23

Yet it is doubtful whether investors need this kind of protection.
When it comes to securities class actions, there is a well-developed
“market” for opt-outs. Investors who are capable of opting out (in the
sense that their losses are large enough to make an individual action
economically feasible) are likely to be well counseled about the
benefits and drawbacks of proceeding individually. As a result, it is
unlikely that any plaintiff will be unfairly bound by an adverse
judgment. If the question of price impact—including efficiency and
publicity—is entirely left in jurors’ hands, investors are well
positioned to decide whether to roll the dice on an unfavorable
decision. And if a jury finds in the class’s favor and concludes the
market was efficient, there was, in hindsight, no need for a judge’s
82
interference in the first place.
The true rationale for requiring an efficiency determination at
class certification, then, likely lies in a desire to protect defendants,
rather than plaintiffs. But, at least as a theoretical matter, defendants
should not need such protection, because they can challenge market
efficiency and price impact before the fact-finder. Therefore, courts
could only be protecting defendants against the fact-finder itself—
protection against the risk that the fact-finder (namely, a jury) will
83
reach an incorrect determination, or, relatedly, the risk that the sheer
unpredictability of the fact-finder’s determination will lead to
increased discovery costs and a coerced settlement on a meritless
claim.
To the extent courts explicitly articulate their distrust of juries in
the context of class certification, they typically declare that

of accidentally embroiling a court in a morass of individualized issues that could have been
avoided but for certification.
82. Moreover, if the court is truly concerned about “binding” absent class members to an
adverse determination in the absence of market efficiency, there are better solutions than to
require an efficiency determination at the class-certification stage. For example, the court could
try the issue of efficiency first, and either decertify the class if efficiency is lacking, or certify the
class only as to the remaining elements under Rule 23(c)(4). Alternatively, the court could
allow absent plaintiffs to bring their own lawsuits on direct reliance theories in the event of an
adverse efficiency determination. It is relatively common for plaintiffs to discard theories of
recovery that require individualized determinations to allow for class-wide adjudication; when
they do, courts sometimes (though not always) allow absent class members to take a second bite
at the apple with individualized claims, so long as they do not seek to re-litigate issues that were
adjudicated in the class proceeding. See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 785–86 (2013).
83. Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlement Pressure, Class-wide Arbitration, and CAFA,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1892–94 (2006).
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certification is improper for an “immature” tort. The “immature” tort
is a set of novel legal and factual claims (usually arising in the context
of mass torts, such as tobacco) that the court believes are better
adjudicated on an individual basis so the parties can develop their
understanding of the claims’ merits and the likelihood of the
85
86
plaintiffs’ success. But whatever merits of the immature tort theory,
it has no application in the fraud on the market context, where the
legal and factual bases for the claims are exceedingly well developed.
As for the notion that class certification puts unwarranted
settlement pressure on defendants because of the unpredictability of
the verdict, the extent to which courts may consider the possibility
87
under Rule 23 is a matter of some controversy. Several courts have
deemed consideration of “blackmail” settlements to be a legitimate
part of the class-certification inquiry, and have responded either by
holding plaintiffs to a high burden of proof in establishing that Rule
88
23’s requirements are met, or by giving the possibility its own
89
independent weight. At the same time, however, a preliminary merits
inquiry would seem to contravene Supreme Court pronouncements
90
regarding the proper scope of Rule 23. And whatever the status of
this debate in general, in both Amgen and Halliburton II, the Court
explicitly rejected the argument that securities class-action procedures
84. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1475,
1481–82 (2005).
85. See id.
86. Some courts have explicitly rejected the theory. See, e.g., Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382
F.3d 1241, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004).
87. Compare In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995), with Klay v.
Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Joshua P. Davis & Eric L. Cramer,
Antitrust, Class Certification, and the Politics of Procedure, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 969 (2010).
Significantly, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), and Comcast Corporation
v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013)—two of the Supreme Court’s most recent decisions tightening
standards for class certification—the Court made no mention of the need to protect defendants.
88. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 747 (5th Cir. 1996).
89. Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 167 n.8 (3d Cir.
2001).
90. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177–78 (1974); Amgen Inc. v. Conn.
Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1195 (2013). Some courts and commenters have
recommended that class certification be denied when it results in the creation of liability that
Congress likely did not anticipate. This is most likely to occur when claims are subject to
statutory damages; in that context, Congress may not have intended to create the kind of
massive liability that results from aggregation. If so, the class-action procedure is itself at odds
with congressional intent. See Nagareda, supra note 82, at 1885–87. This concern, however, only
applies to certain kinds of statutes, and has no application in the securities context, where
Congress unquestionably anticipated—and legislated for—class-action remedies. See
Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2413 (2014) (recognizing that Congress enacted the PSLRA to
shape and reform securities class actions).
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should be modified to avoid unwarranted settlement pressure on the
grounds that Congress has already designed a variety of alternative
91
screening mechanisms to reduce the possibility of frivolous lawsuits.
Thus, if settlement pressures are off the table as part of the Rule
23 inquiry, the more theoretically sound conclusion may be that not
only should courts not consider price impact at class certification, but
also that they should not stand sentry over the efficiency
determination—at least so long as plaintiffs have enough evidence of
efficiency to avoid summary judgment. Yet despite the Halliburton II
Court’s recognition that settlement pressures are not an appropriate
Rule 23 consideration, it did not dig deeper and connect fraud on the
market class certification to the underlying purposes of Rule 23.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Halliburton II, the Court started from the proposition that
efficiency is suitable for examination at the class-certification stage.
With that premise in hand, the remaining issues—materiality, price
impact, and so forth—became matters of line-drawing. And one
cannot help but suspect that the (purported) ease with which
plaintiffs obtain class certification in securities cases helped to dictate
92
the line the Court drew. Unfortunately, this particular line is both
impractical and theoretically unsound, and will likely lead to
inconsistencies going forward.

91. See Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1200–01; Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2413.
92. Langevoort, Judgment Day, supra note 33, at 46–47.

